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ABSTRACT
Implicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and
utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less
risk averse firms. Incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary
layoffs in contract markets: otherwise, contracts are efficient and pareto
optimal by construction. There is a close relation between contract theory
and neoclassical labor market theory. Contracts smooth consumption, but
increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand dis-
turbances, because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of
socially diversifiable risks. This result is similar to the intertemporal
substitution hypothesis. However, the price mechanism in a contract is sub-
stantially different. Contracts embody a nonlinear two—part pricing scheme.
The lump sum part allocates the income—consumption consequences of risks and
the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization. This
implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects "flexible," though theobserved
average hourly wage combines both parts and may give theoutward appearance
of rigidity. Furthermore, the observed average wage rate in a contract does
not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometricestima-
tion. Indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between
work—sharing and layoffs. Contracts with private information are alsoconsidered





The ideas associated with implicit contracts originate in the work of
Martin Baily (19714), Costas Azariadls (1975) ——whoapparently coined the term
——andDonald F. Gordon (19714) though certain pre—Keynesian views of' the labor
market such as the remarkably enduring work of John R. Hicks (1932), and later
analyses by Armen Aichian (1969) and others are important predecessors. This
line of research has been extremely active in the past decade and is notable for
bringing rnicroeconomic theory to bear on the problem of unemployment and employ-
ment fluctuations. Forty years ago Franco Modigliani (191414) identified the
workings of the labor market as the weak link in understanding macroeconomic
fluctuations. The promise of implicit contract theory lies in taking a step
toward repairing that deficiency. Practical interest in this theory also has
been promoted by a search for alternatives to the Phillips' Curve approach to
labor market equilibrium, which was criticized for its inconsistencies with
microtheory by Milton Friedman (1968) and Robert Lucas (1973), and which failed
empirically in the inflationary environment of the 1970s.
The speed with which the term implicit contracts has entered the
economics vocabulary is slightly astonishing, but perusal of the literature
reveals considerable controversy and strongly held differences of opinion on the
meaning of the term and its implications. It is natural enough that passions
tend to be aroused by any model purporting to analyze employment security and
stability, and professional disagreements in this area undoubtedly are not made
less intense by intellectual tensions in the field of macroeconomics today.
These debates will not be joined here. My goal is limited to presenting some
elementary versions of the theory with sufficient clarity to reveal its main
content and its relationship with more conventional ways of thinking about labor2
markets. For these reasons as well as the fact that research in this area is
proceeding at a rapid pace, it is inevitable that this survey is incomplete.
Additional material may be found in the surveys by Azariadis (1979), Azariadis
arid Joseph Stiglitz (1983), Oliver Hart (1983), Takatoshi Ito (1983) and Aba
Schwartz (1983), which differ in style and perspective from what is presented
here.
The following serves as a summary and overview.
(1) Viewing labor market exchange in terms of contracts represents an
interesting and novel methodological departure from conventional models in which
market wage rates decentralize impersonal and unilateral labor demand decisions
by firms on the one hand and labor supply decisions by workers on the other. In
contrast, contracts are inherently bilateral negotiations between partners that
are disciplined by external opportunities, making analysis of the labor market
more akin to the marriage market than to the bourse. Contract markets are
supported by frictions and specificity of employment relationships that tend to
insulate contracting parties from short—run external shocks and which take
current wage rates "out of competition" in allocating labor resources.
(2) A contract is a voluntary ex—ante agreement that resolves the
distribution of uncertainty about the value and utilization of shared invest-
ments between contracting parties. The contract precisely specifies the amount
of labor to be utilized and the wages to be paid in each state of nature, that
is, conditional on information (random variables) observed by both parties.
Wage payments in a contract reflect both allocative production decisions and
risk—sharing and income transfer decisions jointly determined by both parties.3
(3) Contracttheory neither resolves nor illuminates questions of
Keynesian unemployment based on nominal wage and price rigidities, money illu-
sion and nonmarket clearing. Explanations for "sticky" wages and prices that
impede efficient labor utilization must be sought in other quarters. Contracts
allocate resources through a subtle and "flexible" nonlinear pricing mechanism,
which sometimes gives the outward appearance of rigidities in observed real
wages and prices. But these observed rigidities signal little about market
failure.
(ii)The most important empirical implications of contract theory
follow from the hypothesis that contract wages embody implicit payments of
insurance premiums by workers in favorable states of nature and receipt of
indemnities in unfavorable states. Contractual income transfers smooth
consumption, which interacts with labor utilization by eliminating income
effects. The prominence of substitution effects promotes an elastic labor
utilization response to socially diversifiable external shocks. Contracts tend
to increase the volatility of employment, but these effects are difficult to
detect in structural econometric models because observed wages reflect more than
production/labor supply efficiency margins in contract markets.
(5) Only socially diversifiable risks are contractually insurable.
Complete contracts and full risk—shifting imply that all ex post aspects of
contracts, including possible layoffs and unemployment, are "voluntary:" laid—
off workers in a firm are rioworseoff than those remaining employed, distinctly
non—Keynesian. Nondiversifiable and uninsurable risks, risk aversion of firms,
information asymmetries and other costs that make contracts incomplete are
needed to create ex post involuntary aspects into contract terms. Incomplete
risk shifting qualifies the main empirical implications of contracts because
income effects play a more prominent role under those circumstances:'4
Consumption varies more and labor utilization varies less in response to demand
shocks than when contracts are complete, similar to conventional theory.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section presents some
background and contextual discussion of labor market contracts. An elementary
contract is analyzed in section III, where employment is modeled as an all—or—
nothing affair. This model has some simple properties, but its special features
obscure the relations between contract theory and conventional theories of labor
markets. Section IV presents a more familiar model which clarifies these
relationships. Section V takes up the distinction between layoffs and workshar-
ing viewed as choices at the extensive and intensive margins. Section VI
sketches some extensions to intertemporal problems and the relation between
contract theory and intertemporal substitution theory. The models in sections
h—Vu are based on common information assumptions. Much research in this area
has investigated asymmetric information models as sources of market failure.
Discussion of that work necessarily requires more advanced methods and appears
in section VII. Conclusions are found in section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
The first substantial treatment of the effects of unemployment on a
labor market is Adam Smith's discussion of equalizing wage differences on un-
employment risk. Smith recognized that workers exposed to such risks, e.g.,
bricklayers, would require higher wages while employed to compensate for less
regular work patterns and to sustain consumption during periods of slack demand.
An extra premium might be needed to compensate risk averse workers for bearing
earnings risk.5
Refined development of this idea has occurred only in recent years,
beginning with the work of Michael Todaro (1969), John Harris and Todaro (1970),
Arnold Harberger (1971) and Jacob Mincer (1976), which is notable for analyzing
the effects of market controls and minimum wages on unemployment, viewed as an
equilibrium phenomenon. Workers array their search activities across markets to
equate expected earnings in each. If wages are constrained as a clearing
mechanism, something else must do the job and that is the probability of finding
employment. In equilibrium workers queue up for high wage jobs in the regulated
sector: greater unemployment and smaller job finding probabilities are observed
in those markets where wages are highest to enforce the equilibrium supply
condition. These models have had some success in explaining urban unemployment
in less developed economies.
Robert Hall (1970) incorporated some novel inventory theoretic ideas
into models of this type to account for persistent spatial differences in
unemployment. Cities with greater equilibrium unemployment rates must pay wage
premiums to attract workers. Higher wages support longer unemployment spells
and more frequent transitions between jobs, and represent the implicit prices
that firms must pay for the privilege of drawing on an inventory of ready labor.
The advantage of this reserve army of the unemployed, as it were, lies in
greater flexibility and quicker responses of employment decisions by firms
facing shifting and uncertain demands. Robert Topel (19814) extended the argu-
ment to incorporate intermarket mobility and found evidence of equalizing dif-
ferences on local unemployment rates when unemployment insurance is properly
accounted for. A full market equilibrium analysis in this vein was attempted,
but incompletely realized by Hall (1979).6
The most complete micro—analysis of equalizing differences in the
Smithian mode so far is by John Abowd arid Orley Ashenfelter (1981, 19814), based
on utility theory and rationing constraints on hours availability. This and
related work by Robert Hutchens (1983) and Stephen Bronars (1983) find small,
but persistent equalizing wage rate difference effects on average hours of work
restrictions and layoff rate differences among jobs, but insignificant, if not
perverse effects on the variability or risk elements. Small effects for mean
differences might be expected when the value of leisure is taken into account,
but the unsubstantial effects of risk are not consistent with this theory.
The literature reviewed here concentrates much more on the contractual
features of labor market exchange than on implicit risk attributes of jobs.
However, an important link between the two is provided in an unpublished paper
by H. Gregg Lewis (1969) and more recently by Tomb Kinoshita (1985). Lewis
analyzed a deterministic market in which both employers and employees care about
hours worked per employee. The equilibrium that emerges out of this analysis
looks much different than that of a traditional market: a single wage does not
clear the market. Instead, each firm offers fixed wage—hours packages, insist-
ing that its employees work a fixed number of hours in exchange for a fixed
income or seek employment elsewhere. A nonlinear equalizing wage-hours locus
across firms serves as the equilibrium concept. There is an important sense
in which implicit contract theory extends these ideas to incorporate uncer-
tainty, since a contract specifies wage—work package deals for each state of
nature.
Professional interest in contract theory has been stimulated by a
number of recent empirical observations on labor market institutions. Many
features of labor markets bear little resemblance to impersonal Wairasian7
auction markets. Chief among them is the remarkable degree of observed worker—
firm attachment. Martin Feldstein's (1975) surprising finding that over 70
percent of layoffs are temporary, with most laid-off workers ultimately return-
ing to their original employers, was confirmed on similar aggregate data by
David Lllieri (1980) and by much different methods on micro—panel data in a
recent study by Lawrence Katz (1985). The typical adult male worker spends
twenty years or more on a single job (Hall, 1982) and the probability of job
turnover is a sharply declining function of job tenure (e.g., Mincer and Boyan
Jovanovic, 1981 and William Randolph, 1983). Most job changes in a worker's
life occur at younger ages, and a person who has persisted in the same job for a
few years is likely to continue employment in it for a long time to come. If
tenure is de jure In academia, it is de facto in much of the labor market at
large. These findings can be explained by search theory through "job shopping"
(William Johnson, 1979) or searching for the best "match" between a worker and a
firm (Jovanovic, 1979).
The rationale for observed employment continuity ultimately rests on
Gary Becker's (19614) concept of firm—specific human capital, which formed the
basis of the earlier quasi—fixed cost theory of employment fluctuations
originated by Walter 01 (1962). Robert Hart (19814) presents an up—to—date
discussion and prior references. Quasi—fixed cost theory and implicit contract
theory share many of the same features and assumptions, as demonstrated in the
recent book by Arthur Okun (1981), who attempted an Integration of the two.
Charles Schultze (1985) pursues this line. Fixed costs, firm—specific invest-
ments or match—specific capital create the equivalent of market frictions that
render significant value to enduring employment relationships. Maintenance of
existing employment attachments creates shared rents which introduce a wedge8
betweenthe value of a current job and outside opportunities. Rents relax
momentary arbitrage constraints between current wages, current fortunes of the
firm, and general labor market conditions, as in the economics of marriage
(Becker, 1973). Under these circumstances it is expected present values of
wages that matter to firms and workers, not necessarily the current wage. Wage
income is in part an installment payment on specific—investments (Hall, 1980.
J.R. Miller, 1971 presents an interesting early model along these lines which
deserves to be pursued).
Fixed cost theory focuses on quantity adjustments of labor inputs to
changing demand conditions. Implicit contract theory potentially provides a
more complete description of wage adjustments as well. For if firm—specific
investments are an important component of labor market exchange, employment
specificity implies that the worker is effectively a partner in his enterprise.
But the return on specific capital embodied in workers is Inherently stochastic
and Its joint ownership raises deep questions of how this capital is utilized
and how its risks are shared. An ex ante agreement or contract resolves these
issues of utilization and risk sharing.
Theoretical research on contracts has been propelled by recent
developments in the economics of uncertainty and information. Feldstein's
(1976) and Bally's (1977) analyses of the U.S. unemployment insurance system
showed the practical relevance of applying insurance principles to certain labor
market activities. Economists' increasing understanding of state—contingent
claims theory (Kenneth Arrow, 19614 and Gerard Debreu, 1959) has played its part
as well.
However, the idea of implicit contracts goes back to Frank Knight's
s1921) views of the entrepreneur as a residual income recipient and bearer of9
risk.Knight's entrepreneur makes contractual commitments to input suppliers
and earns a risky return on the difference between stochastic receipts and fixed
contractual and other costs (Friedman, 1962). Contracts with workers are sup-
ported by human capital specificity. Occupational selection suggests that
entrepreneurs are less risk averse than the average person (Richard Kihistrom
and Jean—Jacques Lafforit, 1979, 1983). Modern analysis also shows that entre-
preneurs shift some of these risks to the capital market. Nonetheless, afirm's
owners may have comparative advantage at risk management through portfolio
diversification, whereas a worker's main wealth is nonmarketable human capital.
Specialized human capital, and firm—specific human capital in particular, isnot
diversifiable and does not collateralize consumption loans in modern economies.
Furthermore, there are practical limitations, from moral hazard and adverse
selection, on private unemployment insurance markets, because workers and
employers share employment and wage decisions in any state of nature. The
insurance features of contracts therefore manifest the gains from trade between
effectively more and less risk averse agents, and, since employment and earnings
decisions are internalized at the firm level, partially avoid direct monitoring
by third parties. It is these risk—shifting gains from trade that intermingle5
Insurance and productive efficiency considerations in observed contract wages,
and which determines how risks on shared investments are allocated.
Casting employment arrangements in contractual terms leads to a fun-
damentally different analysis conceptually from that of a standard competitive
market. In traditional theory the worker is presented with a market—determined
wage and decides how much labor to supply to the market at large atthat wage.
The firm decides how much impersonal labor services to buy. A contract
specifies, up front, exactly how much labor the worker must supply and exactly10
what the wage will be in various circumstances at some particular firm. When
the state of nature is actually realized there Is no further scope for free
choice at some external market—determined wage rate. Instead, the worker
supplies precisely the agreed upon quantity of labor (possibly none) at the
previously agreed—upon wage payment, even though he might ex post prefer some-
thing different. Sometimes the agreement even transfers the rights of employ-
ment and hours determination to the complete discretion of a specific employer.
These aspects of ex ante bilateral negotiation and agreement inherent in a
contract system have rio counterpart in an idealized decentralized competitive
market in which all decisions are impersonal and unilateral. This difference is
well expressed by Okun's (1981) felicitous characterization of a contract market
as the "invisible handshake" rather than the invisible hand.
An employment relationship represents a complex interaction of
authority, delegation, personal interactions and monitoring, so complex that
remarkably few provisions are actually writtendown.1 Yet the economic analysis
of implicit contracts amounts to working out the details of an explicit contract
concerning wages and employment under uncertainty. Hence an implicit contract
must be interpreted in the "as if" sense of an explicit one, as a mutual under-
standing between worker and employer that the invisible handshake implies, as in
commercial contracts. At one level applying this as—if principle is no differ-
ent from most theorizing in economics. At another, we know that contracts do
not contain all contingencies because many of them cannot be foreseen and there
are so many possibilities that contracting costs are prohibitive. The extent to
which formal consideration of these costs and benefits affects any as—if model
which ignores them is an open question that can be answered only by the empiri-
cal usefulness of the simpler theory.11
III. CONTRACTS WITH LAYOFFS
The literature on implicit contracts has introduced some new language
and technical paraphernalia that sometimes makes the fundamental ideas difficult
to grasp. This section sets out a simple one-period model aimed at clarifying
the essential concepts. Models of this timeless type were first introduced by
Azariadis (1975) and much of the subsequent literature has followed in this
vein.
The basic set—up is this: The firm contracts with a group of workers,
for simplicity assumed to be identical in talents and preferences, and produces
an output with a production function that depends on the utilized labor of its
contract employees. This production function has conventional properties,
except that it is shocked by a random variable 0. The stochastic disturbance 0
is meant to reflect demand uncertainty and shocks to technology or other input
supplies that are produced by external forces not controlled by contracting
parties. The term "common knowledg&' refers to the assumption that all relevant
information is available to all parties. The probability distribution function
of 0 and the actual ex post realization of 0 is costlessly observed and agreed
upon by all contracting parties. This assumption carries great force, forit
implies that the contract can be conditioned on the realization, that is, on the
"state of nature" that actually materializes ex post.
The contract is a set of conditions such as: "if e turns out to have
the value then the worker agrees to supply exactly xxxx units of labor in
exchange for exactly xxxx dollars." Statements of this form cover every pos-
sible realization of 0. This, and the fact that information is complete means
that there is no economic rationale for any ex post renegotiation of terms (no
"new" information comes in). Of course, nature is random, so contracting12
parties might well regret certain ex post realizations, similar to the way a
poker player might have ex post regret, though there is nothing to be done about
it then. These informational assumptions seem severe, to be sure, but they are
exactly the same as the Arrow—Debreu contingent claims market model. Much work
has been and continues to be done on models in which information Is not common
In this sense. However, the basic Ideas are most easily seen in the simpler
common information models.
The key simplifying assumption In Azarladis's model is specifying
worker preferences In the form uU(C +mL),where C is consumption, L Is the
fraction of time devoted to leisure, and m is a constant. Normalize L so that
o < L < 1. The worker is assumed to be risk averse: U' > 0 and U" < 0. This
utility function has linear indifference curves: C and L are perfect substi-
tutes, with constant marginal rate of substitution m. Alternatively, imagine
the worker dividing his available unit of time between market work and the
production of an equivalent but nonmarketable good with production function mL.
Here m is the marginal product of time in producing nonmarket goods. In either
case, m is the unique reservation price of time supplied to market work. The
conventional labor supply problem has a very simple solution in this case:
either the worker supplies his entire endowment of time to the market or to
leisure. This feature carries over to a contract as well. It is natural to
identify a contractual provision which stipulates L =1in some state of the
world as a layoff in that state.
The firm's production function is assumed to be of the form x =Of(N),
where N is utilized labor services and f'(N) > 0 and f"(N) < 0: positive and
decreasing marginal product of labor. Capital Is ignored. The random variable
0 is distributed with known distribution function G(e) and density function13
G'(e)g(e). Its mean is Ee —p,known at the time the contract is struck
(alternatively, p may be random, but the contract is conditioned on it). Since
the contract will specify either L -0or L •1for workers with preferences
such as these, write N -pn,where n is the fixed number of workers under con-
tract, p is the proportion of them who work, and 1 —pis the proportion who
don't work or the layoff rate. Furthermore 0 < p < 1. Given some realization
of 0, the contract specifies a wage payment C1 to those employees instructed to
work and possibly a layoff payment C2 to those who are laid off. Work or non—
work assignments are drawn by lot, represented by the employment probability, p.
Thus, the contract specifies a set of three numbers (C1, C2, p) for each pos-
sible outcome 0. Another way to describe it is by three functions of the
outcomes: C1(0), C2(e) and p(8).
An employed worker CL0) receives no nonmarket goods and obtains
utility under the contract. This occurs with probability p(0). A laid
off worker CL 1) produces inunitsof the nonmarket good and has contracted for
C2(0) of market goods, so utility is U(C2(0) +in).This occurs with probability





The contract {C1(e),C2(0),p(e)} maximizes the worker's expected utility (1)
subject to an expected profit or utility constraint for the firm. It is pareto
optimal by construction.2 In state 9 the firm produces output of value
Of(p(0)n) and incurs contractual costs of npCe)C1(0) paid to employed workers
and costs of n(1 —p(0))C2(0)
paid to laid—off workers. The managers of the14







The equilibrium contract maximizes (1) subject to Ev a v and corresponds to one
point on the Pareto frontier between Eu and Ev.
Think of an economy composed of many such firms with the disturbance 0
independently distributed among them, so many in fact that the mean E0 iis
realized with the probability 1 (the entire distribution G(0) Is realized across
firms ex post ——otherwisefeasibility requires the contract to be conditioned
on the sample mean). To justify the solution of the constrained maximum problem
as a description of the observed contract, think of firms competing for contract
workers and making their joint investments (not modeled in this literature) at
the beginning of the period. Firms compete for workers by offering favorable
contract terms, given Investments, and in devising these terms manager/owners
diversify their risks by trading residual profit claims on an asset market.
Possible risk aversion of firms is justified by some incompleteness in risk
markets. For example, there may be bankruptcy possibilities or agency problems
between owners and managers that make complete managerial diversification
undesirable. If managers' reservation utility level is v and they are supplied
elastically, then the equilibrium contract transfers rents to workers and the
proposed solution follows as a competitive market equilibrium.15
Associating a negative—valued multiplier A (from Pareto optimality)
with constraInt (2), setting up the Lagrarigian function and differentiating












The arguments C1, C2, p and ir (profits) in (3)shouldbe understood as functions
of 6, but this functional notation is supressed to save space. The term in
p(l —p)in the third condition takes care of the constraint 0 < p <1.
The first two conditions determine optimal risk sharing among risk
averse agents as in Karl Borch (1962), Arrow (1971), and Robert Wilson (1968):
marginal utilities between agents are proportional in all possible realizations;
or iJ'(C1(e))U'(C2(e) +in), whichin turn implies C1(O)C2(e) +in and
U(C1(o)) —U(C2(e)
+in). Therefore,when the firm provides layoff pay (C2)
contracts make no ex post utility distinctions between employed and unemployed
workers for any given value of 0. Of course workers attached to firms with
favorable realizations of 8 are better of f ex post than workers attached to
firms with unfavorable realizations of e (if the firm is risk averse and not all
risk is shifted), but all workers in the same firm get the same ex post utility
independent of employment status. Layoffs are voluntary in this sense, though
workers attached to a low 6 firm may envy those in a larger 6 firm ex post.




+m) 0 arid C1 —
C2
-mfrom the first two conditions. If 0
is such that 0 < p < 1, then p(0) Is determined so that the marginal product of
a unit of labor equals its social opportunity cost: ef'(pn) rn.However, this
marginal condition does not hold with equality at the corners. When 0 turns out
to be very large, the firm would like to employ a great deal of labor, but has
contracted with only n workers. In this case p =1and Of'(n) > m. Similarly,
when 0 is small enough, the marginal value product of labor falls short of its
opportunity cost, in which case the firm shuts down its operations and
ef'(O) K m. This is illustrated in figure 1. The elbow shaped curve is the
firm's internal supply curve of contract labor. Labor utilization decisions
have a reservation property: for e > 0*, p is set equal to 1, and all of the
firm's workers are fully employed. 6* is defined by 0*f?(n) =m.For e < e,
the firm shuts down, and all workers are laid off. The condition O**f(O)
defines 6*. For e K 0 K 8*, some of the firm's workers are fully employed
and others are laid off. In this region the employment rate p(0) Is increasing
In 6, and the firm's layoff rate is decreasing in 0.
Notice that the ex post marginal product of labor is not equated
across all firms in a contract market. It is equated only for the fraction
G(8*) —G(8**)which have a common shadow price of labor in.Themarginal
product of labor exceeds m for those firms experiencing outcomes more favorable
than 6*. This is not a sign of social Inefficiency because employment
specificity makes it too costly to move workers from one firm to another.17
Nonetheless, those firms for which 8 > G have ex post demands for
temporary labor, and one might envision certain labor market institutions aris-
ing to take advantage of the situation. One possibility is a subcontract market
of temporary workers (Melvin Reder, 1962). The personal productivity of such
workers would not be as large as that of contract workers due to less specific
human capital, though movements across firms would help arbitrage differences in
marginal values of labor across firms. It has been claimed that the Japanese
labor market makes heavy reliance on this type of system, and perhaps guest
workers in European economies (and use of illegal immigrants in the U.S.) can be
partially explained in these terms. A temporary labor market for laid off
workers would also serve these purposes. Further, if workers differ in their
reserve price of labor m, it is straightforward to show that the firm rationally
contracts with several different classes of workers. Those with larger values
of m are used as reserves, and are called to work only in the most favorable
realizations, similar to the way a power pool brings relatively inefficient
generators on line only in periods of peak demand (Azariadis, 1976; Rosen,
1983). Finally, there may be incentives for firm mergers or product diver—
sification that more easily accommodate worker transfers between operating
units. The limits of the firm would then be determined by balancing the gains
of internal reassignments of workers against the usual diseconomies of scale and
lesser overall productivity of the firm's work force due to lesser labor
specialization among divisions. This point is related to the gains to flexi-
bility and adaptability in an uncertain environment (George Stigler, 1939).
The implications of this model can be seen in an especially striking
manner when firms are risk neutral [v'(g)1J. Then (3) implies complete
consumption insurance for all workers in all firms. In this case the first two
marginal conditions in (3) are independent of 0 because the term in v'(n(O))18
equals unity. Therefore C1(6) and C2(6) are constants for all values of 0,
given i.Allemployed workers in all firms receive the same incomes and so do
all unemployed workers. Furthermore, the ex post utility levels
U(C1) IJ(C2 +m)are independent of 6 and the same for all workers. The labor
utilization condition in (14) remains unchanged. This case is in fact equivalent
to complete and costless contingent claims markets in which all socially insur-
able risks are diversified away, and is identical to the standard insurance
result that risk averse people are completely insured when premiums are actually
fair. It Is as If firms contracted with an actuarially fair insurance company,
turned over their entire output to the common fund and contracted to withdraw
pro-rata shares.
To further clarify this strong result, write 0 =pcwhere c Is an
Idiosyncratic Independent and identically distributed firm-specific random
variable with distribution function Z(c) where Ec1 and p Is a common economy—
wide aggregate shock which strikes all firms equally. In a one—period model p
is an undiversiflable risk (this is not necessarily true In a rnultlperIod
dynamic model ——seesection VI). Given the information assumptions, all ex
ante contracts must be conditioned on p as well as on c because of social budget
constraints: feasible contracts cannot redistribute more market Income than is
actually produced.
A larger value of p shifts the marginal value product curves to the
right in figure 1 for every possible value of c and a smaller p value shifts
these curves down and to the left. Substituting 0pc Into (14), we see that
given some realization p, firms for which c > c* =m/pf'(n)fully utilize their
work force. The value of p for firms on the interior of (14) is also increasing
In p. Consequently the utilization rate of labor In the work force as a whole19
isincreasing in p and the aggregate unemployment rate is decreasing in p.
Finally, when v(lt) is linear, (2) defines the social budget constraint for









National income per head (the left—hand side of (5) divided by n) is increasing
in p through its direct multiplicative effect and its indirect effect of
increasing p. Therefore C1(p) arid C2(p) are increasing in p.
Diversifiable riskis completely shifted in this complete contracts
case: consumption and utility are independent of local demand E,suggestiveof
a form of "real wage rigidity" for these types of demand shocks. Laid off
workers are no worse off than employed workers, and layoffs are voluntary.
However, a contract market does not at all imply real wage rigidity for unin—
surable risks: the consumption and utility levels of workers, be they employed
or not, are strictly increasing functions of "aggregate demand" p. Everyone is
better off ex post when p is larger and worse off when p issmaller.5
The model sketched above has the undesirable prediction that laid off
workers fare no worse than employed workers. It is the assumption that consump-
tion and employment risk can be shifted without transactions costs that accounts
for much of this result. By analogy, a person who can buy actuarial no—load
insurance buys enough to be indifferent to whether his house burns down or not.
But that is just a consequence of a simplifying assumption. Most people are
worse of f if their house burns because they are not fully insured. Incomplete20
insurance is rational when premiums are nonactuarial and when full insurance
implies moral hazard. This is also true of the insurance In an Implicit
contract. The point gains greater force in this context because workers and
firms jointly control layoff decisions, precisely the type of situation where
coinsurance Is known to be desirable. Therefore, incomplete insurance, or more
generally some Incompleteness In state contingent claims markets, is necessary
to get involuntary layoffs into these models. John Bryant (1978) was the first
to point this out; see also Thomas Sargent (1979), Sanford Grossman and Hart
(1981), and Bengt Holmstrom (1981). While the point has created much contro-
versy on the usefulness of common knowledge contract models, It seems to methat
considerable Insight is gained by analyzing actuarial cases, as in more conven-
tional Insurance problems.
It Is by no means obvious how to incorporate nonactuarial elements
into a formal model. The most straightforward way is to interpret the contract
as a pooling arrangement with a risk—neutral mutual insurance company and add an
employment claims processing cost to the company's budget constraint, similarly
to the way load factors are calculated In conventional insurance premiums.
Space limitations preclude extended development here. Consider instead an
extreme case in which costs of providing private insurance to the unemployed are
so large that none is provided at all. This adds the constraint C2(O) =0to
the problem above and is exactly Azarladis's (1975) original formulation.
The absence of Indemnities to unemployed persons means that unemployed
workers receive incomes of m alone, and the second marginal condition In (3) is
irrelevant. But the first one remains. All employed workers receive the same
wage C1 if the firm is risk neutral (v' =1)and their consumption Is fully
Insured. The wage C1 paid to employed persons must exceed m or else no one21
would be inclined to work. Therefore U(C1) > U(m) and employed persons in the
same firm are better off ex post than the unemployed. Laid off workers have
drawnthelosing hand and definitely preferemployment.6
One might expect Incomplete Insurance to affect production efficiency.
The third condition in (3) verifies this intuition. Substituting for Any' from
the first condition in (3) and noting that 0 by assumption, we have, for
p>0




This condition holds with equality on the interior (0 < p < 1), and with
inequality for almost all firms whose workers are fully employed. Itfollows
directly from risk aversion (U" < 0) that the bracketed term on the right hand
side of (6) exceeds C1 —m,the difference in incomes between employed and
unemployed workers. The shadow price of labor is the entire expression on the
right hand and therefore falls short of m when insurance is incomplete.The
horizontal portion of the internal supply curve in figure 1 now lies below m.
Of'(pn) is compared with a smaller supply price in determining p, and the firm
utilizes more of its contract labor compared with complete contracts. m is the
social opportunity cost for firms with 0 < p < 1. There is socially excessive
employment in the incomplete contract equilibrium and social outputwould be
greater if more people were unemployed!
This surprising result is part of a more general proposition in the
economics of insurance. Availability of insurance promotes the undertaking of
socially beneficial risks by separating the average benefits of actions from
fear of risk. Risk averse persons act too cautiously and do not take enough22
good risks when insurance is unavailable. The only way a risk averse worker can
partially insure against the utility loss of layoff and unemployment in this
problem is by working In circumstances when it is socially inefficient to do so.
One more comparison must be made before concluding this section, and
that is to a situation where employment relationships provide no insurance at
all. This state of affairs is sometimes called an "auction market." George
Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980) showed that an auction market can Imply more
unemployment than a contract market. The point Is easy to see in this model
when employers are risk neutral. Then workers In the firm must go it alone.
Any Incomes they receive must be distributed out of own firms' output, since
claims on other firm's outputs are unavailable by assumption. In making Its
collective employment decisions, the firm could then do no better than to com-
pare the marginal productivity of its own labor with the opportunity cost of its
workers' time, which Is m. Therefore, m again becomes the effective shadow
price of labor as in figure 1, employment decisions are socially efficient and
identical to the full contract model. However, these workers are bearing con-
sumption and wage risks, depending on their own realized value of 0, and some of
these are socially diversifiable. Though efficient in production decisions,
this solution is inefficient on risk sharing grounds. Clearly It is Inefficient
In the latter respect relative to a complete contract. However, it is not
obviously less efficient than the incomplete contract, which is inefficient on
the productivity account but possibly more efficient on the risk—sharing ac-
count. Therefore, no contracts at all may dominate an incomplete contract,
depending on the extent of worker risk aversion.23
IV. CONTRACTS AND LABOR SUPPLY
The unusual and unattractive assumptions about worker preferences in
the model above conceals an intimate relationship between contract theory and
the familiar theory of labor supply. Contracts embody an implicit nonlinear
pricing mechanism that eliminates the income effects of insurable risks in the
traditional consumption—leisure choice problem. They thereby smooth consumption
which interacts with labor utilization and promotes elastic labor supply res-
ponses to external stimuli. Contracts suggest much more volatility of employ-
ment to insurable risks than conventional models do.
To illustrate these important points in the most straightforward way,
worker preferences in section III are generalized, and the technology is simpli-
fied. Assume neoclassical worker preferences u =U(C,L).The indifference
curves of U(C,L) are strictly convex and the worker is risk averse. As in the
conventional labor supply problem, the quantity (1 —L)is identified with time
worked, and remaining time L is associated with nonmarket production (partial
layoffs if one wishes). Assume that the firm consists of one worker (n 1)
with production function xef(i —L)where e is the productivity shock. To
simplify even more, assume f(1 —L)is linear. Then the production function is
x0(1 —L)and 0 has the ready interpretation of the marginal product of the
worker's labor, similar to a wage rate. Everything to be said here applies to a
concave function f(.), a refinement that only adds expository noise to the main
point.
Consider first the conventional problem of labor supply under uncer-
tainty. Nature draws a ball out of the 0 urn, the worker observes 0 and makes
the optimal labor—consumption decision. If an external market does not allow
risks to be spread, the worker is constrained to consume out of own production24
(the"auction market" of section III) and any source of nonearned income, say y.
So given 0, the budget constraint Is the standard one, C —0(1—L)+y.The
solution is described by the budget constraint and the first order condition
0UL/IJC, which define demand functions C —C(0,y) and L -L(8,y). Assume
that both C and L are normal goods and compare two alternative realizations of
0. A larger value of e increases C, but has ambiguous effects on L. The sub-
stitution effect tends to Induce greater labor supply (1 —L)but the income
effect works in the other direction and may cause labor supply to fall. Substi-
tuting the demand functions Into the utility function yields the indirect util-
ity function u(0, y). Indirect utility in Increasing in 0 (and y) irrespective
of the labor supply response because full income is Increasing in
An economy with many persons opens possibilities for mutually advan-
tageous social arrangements that allow risk pooling. The conventional problem
strictly ties a worker's consumption to current production, but a contract
allows current consumption to be disassociated from current production for any
given person if risks are diversifiable. The simplest way to model this is to
replace the personal budget constraint with its expectation (over all workers),
precisely what an actuarially fair Insurance policy would do. Yet this is not
standard insurance: the contract specifies exactly how much the person has to
work for each possible realization of' 0 in order to eliminate adverse effects on
work incentives that consumption insurance implies.
Assuming common knowledge, the contract specifies that the worker puts
forth (1 —L(e))hours of work in state 8 and that the wage payment or consump-
tion is C(o) in state e. Expected profitability of the firm is the difference
between expected output and expected wage (consumption) payments25
J[x(o)— C(e)JdG(o)—J[e(i
—L(e))—C(o)JdG. (7)
Complete contracts (given ii)areanalyzed in what follows, assuming risk—neutral
firms, to bring out the connections between conventional theory and contract
theory in the clearest possible way. Competition in the market for contracts
implies that the equilibrium contract solves:




The Lagrangian for this problem is
J{U(C,L) —A[e(1—L)—C]}dG (10)




where A < 0 as before. C and L are solved as functions of B and Afromequa-
tions (11) and (12). Then the expected income constraint is used to solve for A
and hence the optimum contract L(O) and C(8). Notice that the conventional
problem is completely nested in this one. It is feasible that C(O) —x(O),but
the contract surely will not specify equality of consumption and output for
every realization of 0. True, (11) and (12) imply B ——themarginal
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is equated with the mar-
ginal product of labor for •any 0 in a complete contract. However, now there is
an extra degree of freedom: the expected income constraint allows the marginal
utility of consumption to be equated in all states of the world (condition
(11)), the Borch-Arrow—Wilson risk—sharing condition when one of the agents is
risk neutral, equivalent to optimal choice of insurance in the actuarial, no—
load case.
The properties of L(8) and C(0) in the contract are implicit in the
first order conditions (11) and (12). Since A does not depend on 0, comparative
statics on (11) and (12) directly show how C and L respond to 8 in the contract.
(11) and (12) define marginal utility constant demand functions (Ragnar Frisch,
1932), which prove useful when preferences are additively separable, as they are
across states—of—the—world here. Browning, et al. (forthcoming) contains an
elegant statement of the method and gives prior references. Differentiating













ULJ> 0, by risk aversion.
From (13) we have L'(9) < 0, since < 0 by concavity and A < 0.
d(1—L(o))/do1 —L'(e)> 0. The implicit contract always specifies that the
employee works more hours in favorable states (larger values of e) and works
less in less favorable states. There is no ambiguity due to opposing income and
substitution effects in the optimal contract. Negativity of L'(e) is basically
a result of substitution effects. The worker is constrained by the expectation
of output, not by realized output itself. A favorable or unfavorable drawing of
o carries no income effects because the good fortunes of one firm are counter-
balanced by bad fortunes of another for diversifiable risks. Therefore, it 15
always efficient for the worker to work more when the marginal product of labor
is larger (to make hay when the sun shines) and to redistribute consumption by
insurance. If leisure is a normal good, contracts result in greater variance in
hours worked than standard models and intuition based on them suggest.
Equation (11) shows that total wage payments ——identifiedwith con-
sumption under the contract ——arerising, constant, or falling in 0 as UCL 0.
Only when preferences are strongly separable in C and L is it true that
C'(e) —0and consumption is completely smoothed, as in the permanent income
hypothesis (Friedman, 1957). Nonzero cross derivatives UCL strongly link con-
sumption behavior with labor supply.828
That a contract with full insurance does not necessarily imply full
consumption smoothing suggests that the connection between complete insurance
and income effects is more subtle than usual. Full insurance does not stabilize
consumption except when preferences are strongly separable. More surprising, it
does not stabilize ex post utility when leisure is a normal good. In this
bivariate problem full insurance is completely described by condition (11) that
the marginal utility of consumption is equalized in all states of the world, not
necessarily total utility. Define u(8) as ex post indirect utility given B in







The second equality follows from (13) and (1'4). The bracketed term in (15) is
familiar. It determines the sign of the income effect in a conventional labor
supply problem. Ex post utility is completely assured by the contract only if
u' —0,and this happens only when the income effect is zero, or when U(C,
L) =U(C+ip(L))of which section III is a special case. But if' utility is
completely assured, consumption C(e) cannot be assured for it must compensate
for the variation in L. The contract does not assure utility if the income
effect is nonzero. u'(o) is negative when the income effect is positive.9
A complete insurance contract makes a worker who has "suffered" an
adverse draw of an insurable risk better off ex post than a worker who draws a
more favorable value except when income effects are negative. Contracts under—
insure ex post utility levels only when leisure is an inferior good. This29
strong result is a result of strong assumptions. It is not necessarily true
when the firm is risk averse (then v(.) multiplies the right hand side of (11)
and (12) so that risks are shared and insurance is incomplete. Nor is it
necessarily true when information is private or when the shock Is undiversi—
flable. A nondiversifiable risk affects i,andhas a powerful effect on the
total amount of consumption produced and redistributed. It changes the marginal
utility of consumption A. Ex post utility necessarily increases in p, as it did
In section III.
The consumption smoothing and insurance aspects of contracts have
profound implications on the meaning of wage data in a contract market. Ob-
served wages do two things in a contract: they allocate labor and shift
risks.10 These roles are best described by thinking of the observed wage as the
outcome of a two—part variable tariff. The insurance aspect determines the
equivalent of nonearned income in a conventional labor supply problem, condi-
tional on the realized state 0. For risk pooling and insurance to have meaning,
It must be that workers experiencing favorable realizations of 0 subsidize those
with unfavorable realizations. Given these "lump sum" taxes and subsidies, the
contract allows workers to "choose" their optimal labor supply at the correct
"marginal wage" 0, the marginal product of labor.
Define 5(0) as the worker's net debit position with the firm:
5(0)C(e) —8(1—L(e))is the difference between the wage payment and output
In state 8. This equation is of the conventional budget form except that 8(0)
has replaced the usual nonearned Income term. A worker for whom s(0) > 0 is
effectively subsidized by the contract ex post and one for whom s(0) < 0 is
effectively taxed. Substituting 8(0) into the budget constraint (9) reveals
that these subsidies and taxes balance each other on average across all workers30
in an actuarial system. Differentiate s(8) with respect to 0 and substitute






so s(0) is decreasing in 0 if leisure is noninferior.
The two—part tariff interpretation of contracts is shown in figure 2.
The first panel shows the solution to the conventional problem (assuming zero
nonearned income). Two budget lines are shown. The realized marginal product
01 is assumed to be larger than 021 and comparison of equilibrium points in-
volves the usual income and substitution effects. The second panel shows the
effects of a contract, assuming UCL < 0. For 01 above the mean we know from
(16) that the worker is taxed and s(0) < 0. For 2 below the mean the worker is
subsidized and 5(02) > 0. The contract acts as if it puts the 01 worker "in the
hole" by amount s(Oi) and lets him work out of it by choosing L at (marginal)
wage rate 01 along the altered budget constraint. The contract acts as if it
gives the 02 worker a subsidy of s(82) and then allows him to choose hours
worked at marginal wage rate 02• The heavy curve labeled CCL) is the locus of
(C,L) pairs satisfying marginal condition (11), and C'(L) < 0 when UCL < 0. The
familiar marginal condition UL/UC =0implied by (11) and (12) jointly is shown
by the tangencies with the contract budget constraints. It is these adjustments
in the "lump sum" portions of the two part tariff that ameliorate income ef—
fects, that promote consumption smoothing and elastic labor supply responses to
diversifiable risks.31
Figure 2 is useful for studying the observable wage consequences of
contracts. The observed "average hourly wage rate" is measured by dividing
total earnings (equals C(e) in contracts) by hours worked:
W(e) —C(e)/(1—L(e)). (17)
This is how wage rates are measured In virtually all available data. Dif-
ferentiating (17), and substituting from above yields
w'(e)/w(e) [_(UCL/CUCC) +(1/(1—L))]L'(e). (18)
The sign of this expression is unambiguous only when UCL > 0, in which case W(e)
is actually decreasing In e, given p. The sign of W'(e) is ambiguous when
UCL < 0 as in figure 2. Figure 3 illustrates the constructionof W(e) for
preferences without income effects. Here C(L) coincides with an indifference
curve because utility is constant in the contract, from (15). The points marked
A and B correspond to large and small values of e respectively. The measured
everage hourly wage rate is given by the slope of the line connectingeither
point with L1 and C =0,from (17). The two values of 0 have been chosen so
that the wage rate is the same, Illustrating nonmonotonicity of W(O). In this
case W(e) is U—shaped. It is decreasing for 0 sufficiently small and is in-
creasing for 0 sufficiently large.
Two points follow from this:
First, there is no presumption that the measured average wage in a
contract is positively correlated with the state 0, as the U—shaped pattern in
figure 3 shows, a possibility that could be confused with wage rigidity. This
statement refers to real average wage rates and to the diversifiable component32
of the state. If the economy experienced an adverse aggregate shock i,the
contract would have to be recalibrated. The equilibrium indifference curve in
fIgure 3 would be shifted down and the average hourly wage at each hours worked
would be smaller than indicated. Average hourly wages rates should be posi-
tively correlated with noninsurable disturbances in a contract market.
The behavior of average real wages over the business cycle has been
studied for many years. Manufacturing hourly wage rates show no obvious rela-
tionship with aggregate output (Salih Neftci, 1978). Joseph Altonji and
Ashenfelter (1980) suggest that the manufacturing real wage rate resembles a
random walk. However, panel and personal survey data indicate significant
responses of measured personal wage rates to local labor market conditions (John
Raisian, 1983; Mark Bus, 1985; and Topel, forthcoming). James Heckman and
Guilerrue Sedlacek (1981U show that BLS manufacturing numbers may contain selec-
tion bias, since less productive workers are less likely to be employed in
manufacturing during business cycle troughs, making measured wages fall less
than a properly weighted Index.
Second, using measured wage rates may lead to misleading inferences
regarding unemployment or overemployment in personal surveys. Optimality of the
contract means that ex post Pareto-improving recontracts are not possible.
There is also no possibility of choosing hours worked ex post at some exoge—
nously determined wage. In figure 3 the worker is instructed to work (1 —L1)
hours In the state. Total earnings of C1 go along with this, so the average
hourly wage is C1/(1—L1) =W.If the worker could freely choose hours at an
hourly wage rate W he would work up to point C rather than stay at A. In the
state, the contract specifies point B. Here the worker would choose to work
more hours (point C) than the contract specifies if hours could be freely chosen33
atwage rate W. A survey respondent might indicate constraints on hours worked
under these circumstances. The person who drew 02 might say that he would like
more work than he is getting at the 'tgoing" wage rate and that he is irivolunta—
rily underemployed. The worker who drew 01 might respond that work hours are
excessive and that he is involuntarily overemployed.
All this points out a significant problem for empirical analysis.
Virtually all work on labor supply uses a model that assumes point C, that the
worker is free to unilaterally choose hours at the measured wage rate W, whereas
the insurance features of contracts disassociate the measured average wage rate
from both the marginal product of labor and from the marginal rate of' substitu-
tion. This point is conceptual and applies even if average wages were perfectly
measured, so econometric techniques for dealing with measurement error does not
dispose of it. This is not trivial because virtually all econometric work (in
this field and elsewhere) lives or dies by the assumption that measured prices
indicate efficiency margins. Contracts require that the data be adjusted for
the lump sum components 8(0) to impute marginal wage rates. Some recent studies
have attempted to include information on survey responses pertaining to whether
or not the worker is constrained in the choice of hours, but this is generally
viewed as a ration, not as an equilibrium phenomenon along contract lines
(Shelly Lundberg, 19814 gives references and a related discussion).
This section concludes with an interesting and surprising comparative
static experiment. Complete contracts imply that an increase in diversifiable
risk increases expected utility of' risk averse workers.
Following Michael Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), parameterize the
density function as g(o)F(e) +ar(0),where (o) is a density, a is a posi-






Some reflection reveals that r(9) is positive for large and small values of 0
and is negative for intermediate values. Therefore an increase in a puts more
weight In the tails of g(0) and increases the spread of the distribution.
Differentiating the Lagrangian of the maximum problem in (8) with
respect to a and using the envelope property gives
aEu/afu(e)r(0)de —AJ[e(1—L)—C]r(0)dO
This expression may be signed by integrating by parts (twice) and exploiting the
properties of (19) (Peter Diamond and Rothschild, 1978). Assuming g(0) has





sincethe first integral vanishes from first order conditions and (15).
Integrating by parts again gives
aEu/aa ——AJ0J—L'(8)R(T)dTd8
. (20)
The sign of (20) is unambiguously positive because A < 0, L'(O) < 0, from (13),
and J0R(z)dz > 0, from (19). Greater diversifiable risk makes the worker better
off.
This result is unexpected in light of the Smithian equalizing differ-
ences logic, but is easily explained. Full insurance eliminates the adverse
direct consequences of risk aversion on expected utility. Increasing spread
affords the worker superior opportunities of allocating work to the most favor-
able states and limiting losses of unfavorable outcomes by consuming more
leisure. The opportune substitution of work effort toward more productive
states has a value similar to that of an option: that less work is called for in
the less favorable states serves to truncate the lower tail of the 0 distri-
bution.
V. LAYOFFS OR WORKSHARING?
Misconceptions about the nature of the price mechanism in contracts
has led to the impression that contracts somehow rationalize layoffs through
"sticky" wages and prices, and nonmarket clearing. This Impression is wide of
the mark because it confuses ex post contractual wages and prices with conven-
tional "auction" market prices. Section IV clearly demonstrates that resources
in contracts are really allocated by a sophisticated nonlinear price system.
This nonlinear scheme is as flexible as one ordinarily supposes in competitive36
market theory and allocates resources as efficiently as the completeness of
contingent claims markets permits. The true fact is that contracts per se have
little to say about the split between changes in hours per head and layoffs.
Contract outcomes fundamentally depend on preferences and technology, so the
question of layoffs must rest on these same primitives. Section III produced
layoffs by a peculiar assumption about preferences, that market and nonrnarket
goods are perfect substitutes. The conventional formulation in section IV is
not detailed enough to decide these issues.
There are basically two ways of introducing layoffs in contract (or
any other) models. One links layoffs to capital utilization decisions based on
capital heterogeneity and limited ex post substitution between labor and capital
(Lief Johansen, 1972). The Idea is related to the 'tmarginal firm." Marginal
mines shut down completely when the price of ore falls because their quasi—rents
are driven to zero. Production in marginal operations might commence when
demand increases. Restricted ex post capital—labor substitution and fixed
operating costs create nonconvexities that make it advantageous to shut down
inefficient facilities rather than operate them at excess capacity. These ideas
could be extended to various divisions of a multiprocluct or multiplant firm.
The contract model must be extended to incorporate productivity differences
among firms, based perhaps on vintage capital ideas (Solow, 1960), differences
in site—specific factors or in entrepreneurial capacities. This line has not
been pursued much, and will not be developed here.
The other possibility is to directly introduce hours and employees
(bodies) into the firm's technology (Feldstein, 1967; Rosen, 1968; Ray Fair,
1969; M. Ishaq Nadiri and Rosen, 1969; Ben Bernanke, 19814), which serves to link
the models of sections III and IV above. Miyazakl and Neary (1983) and Murry37
Brown and Elmas Wolfstet.ter (19814) have constructed contract models along these
lines.
Extend the production function of section III to xOf(pn, h), where
h is the intensity of work per employed person and f( ) is concave. Think of p
as the fraction of contract labor who are employed. Then 1 —pis the layoff
rate. Alternatively, maintain a timing convention in which the "periodt' is a
year. Then h can be regarded as the length of the work week when employed and p
as the fraction of the year (number of weeks) of employment. h0 durIng
nonworking weeks spent on layoff. To simplify the presentation, I again assume
complete contracts (of course conditional on the mean p of 0) and risk neutral
employers.
Writing the utility function in terms of h rather than L, an employed
worker receives contractual wage payment C1(o) and works h(e) In state 0,
receiving utility U(C1(e), h(9)). A laid off worker receives payment C2(0) and









The equilibrium contract {C1(e), C2(O), h(0), p(0)1 maximizes (21)
subject to (22). First order conditions for C1 and C2 are familiar by now38
Uc(C1(e)i h(e)) Uc(C2(O), 0) ——An (23)
and imply that C2 is independent of B (because An is independent of e). C1
depends on B (unless Uch -0)only if h does. The intensive margin h is (note
that Uh < 0)
h(O))—A8f2(p(O)n, h(e)) (24)
or, substituting from (23) and rearranging, Of2 =(pn)(-Uh/UC):the marginal
product of h in state 0 equals its marginal cost, which is the shadow price
/U) per employed worker times the number employed. The extensive margin p is,















Further analysis of these conditions is neither elementary nor
illuminating. At this level of generality about all that can be said is that
dp/dO0 and dh/dO > 0. Yet time—series data on employment and hours follow
systematic patterns. Aggregate hours and employment variations are positively
correlated with output growth rates (deviations about trend), and hours per week
show variation of less than two hours peak to trough. Employment fluctuations
account for the bulk of total labor utilization adjustments even in deep
recessions. Indivisibilities appear necessary to account for this (Mortensen,
1978; Kenneth Burdett and Mortensen, 1980).39
Consider an example: Assume U(C, h) -U(C—•(h))where U" < 0 and
$(h) is an increasing convex function. Then (23) implies equal utility
in all states ——thereare no income effects ——andC1(O) —C2
4(h(O)) —
Forproduction assume f(pn, h) -F(pnl(h)),where r(h) has the interpretation of
efficiency units of work hours. A long tradition of labor market research sug-
gests that 1(h) may have an ogive shape, due to set—up costs (Sidney Chapman,
1909; Arthur C. Pigou, 1920): productivity of a worker's time is small at small
values of h, rises rapidly after some threshhold is passed, and finally shows
diminishing returns when h is very large. Indivisibilities due to fixed costs of
market participation (John Cogan, 1980; Giora Hanoch, 1980) have similar implica-
tions. (Hanoch discusses including both hours worked and weeks worked as argu-




When 0 < p < 1, the second condition in (26) holds with equality.
Dividing through by the first yields
1'(h)/y(h) ='(h)/[(h)
—,(O)J (27)
which gives a unique solution for h, say h*. At h —h*we must have diminishing
returns, or y't(h*) < 0.(27) is independent of both p and 0, so h(8) =h*,a
constant whenever any layoffs occur. Furthermore we have in this region110
OF'(pnY(h*))4?(h*)/y*(h*)[(h*) —(0)J/Y(h*), (28)
so the shadow price of labor is [$(h*) -•(0)J/Y(h*),a constant independent of
e.(28) defines p(0) when layoffs are positive, and implies that p(0) is
increasing in e. Fewer workers are laid off in more favorable states. Further-
more, wages C1(o) paid to employed workers are rigid and independent of 0 when-
ever layoffs are positive.
Since p(0) is increasing, there must be some critical value 0* beyond
which p1. The firm would like to hire more workers than it has contracted
with in states more favorable than this. Therefore, for 0 > 0* it is h that does
all the adjusting. In this range h(e) is defined by the first condition in (26)
with p set equal to one. The firm's shadow price of labor is '(h)/"(h) here
and is increasing in h on the assumptions above. Therefore h(e) is increasing
for 0 > 0*. C1(e) is Increasing here as well.
The overall solution is pieced together in figure 1!.Theemployment
rate does all the adjusting when 0 falls short of 0. h is rigidly set at h*
here and the shadow price of labor to the firm Is constant. For 0 > 0*, the
shadow price of labor is rising, p1, and hours do all the adjusting.
Furthermore, the wage paid to employed persons is "rigid't downward: C1 is
constant for 0 < 0*. The internal supply price of labor would be smaller than
shown if contracts did not fully indemnify laid—off workers, and layoffs would be
involuntary, as above. In either case the layoff rate is decreasing in i(the
undiversifiable risk) because 0* is decreasing in p.
This example suggests the following interpretation of hours and
employment data. In normal times (the mean of 0 exceeds 0*) hours per worker
account for most total manhours variation (hours are a leading indicator).41
Workers are not laid off until conditions get sufficiently bad to pass beyond the
threshhold 8*, at which point hours per head show downward rigidity that puts
distinct limits on the use of worksharing.
This type of model can account for some of the broader features of the
data, but recent international comparisons present interesting and Important
challenges. Robert J. Gordon (1982) compared the U.S. with Japan. Both coun-
tries exhibit about equal variance In total hours worked, but hours per worker
varies more in Japan than In the U.S. and employment varies more In the U.S. The
widespread use of bonuses makes for greater wage variability in Japan as well.
Models of this type account for these differences on the basis of differences in
preferences and technology and surely leave much unexplained. It appears as If
some consideration of differences in firm—specific human capital, labor mobility,
and quasi—fixed factor ideas are required to fully account for these differences
(Hashimot.o, 1979).
VI. INTEMPORAL CONTRACTS
This survey follows the literature in expositing timeless single period
models. There Is a parallel Intertemporal formulation, following Baily (1974)
who suggested that contracts might exploit gains from trade due to capital market
imperfections. The firm's greater access to capital markets allows It to save
and dissave on the worker's behalf, and eliminates intertemporal uncertainty in
consumption (Brown, 1983) that the worker cannot accomplish on his own. The
contract again specifies consumption (wage payments) and labor utilization in
each state and each time period, conditional on information available in that
period. It mimics the solution to an intertemporal expected utility maximization
problem. Now the observed wage payments Intermingle elements of intertemporalsavings and dissavings as well as the usual productive efficiency considerations.
Nonetheless, the formal analysis has many features in common with the one—period
model. Under complete information the contract specifies (Ct,Lt) pairs condi-
tional on the history of state realizations 0 up to the present time t. In the
leading model the worker has an intertemporally separable utility function of the
form EU(Ct, Lt)Dt, where D is the rate of time preference, similar to (8), and
the firm is risk neutral. The budget constraint at time t equates the expected
present value of future consumption to the expected present value of future
production, conditional on the observed sequence (01 at t, similar to (9).
The precise solution depends on the properties of (Ut} and the extent
to which capital consumption allows intertemporal diversification of aggregate
disturbances (Richard Cantor, 1983). Consider the simplest case in which 0 is
independently distributed over agents with a constant mean (Grossman and Laurence
Weiss, 1981). Then the insurance of section IV is achieved by a consumption loan
market subordinated through firms. Those with adverse realizations borrow on
their worker's behalf and those with favorable realizations are lenders. The
loan market is cleared at a rate of interest equal to the rate of time preference
(to satisfy intertemporal marginal conditions) and the analysis of section IV
carries through intact. Here the 5(0) terms of figure 2 are the savings and
dissavings components of observed earnings of workers, personal consumption is
smoothed and personal labor supply is accentuated by substitution effects.
"Capital market imperfections" introduce ex post involuntary elements in contract
terms, as above.
More generally, write Then the contract is conditioned on
the history of the aggregate shock as well as on local disturbances. These
aggregate shocks are undiversifiable if there are no stores of nonhuman wealth.J43
Anunanticipated adverse aggregate disturbance increases the demand for consump-
tion loans. The rate of interest rises to ration reduced supply. Smaller
aggregate consumption Is redistributed out of the diversifiable risks as before,
but observed consumption and employment contain elements of Keynesian income
effects. The optimal program embodies forecasts of permanent wealth to the
extent that the j—process is serially correlated and persistent. These redistri-
bute planned consumption and labor supply over time through direct wealth effects
and indirectly through their anticipated effects on interest rates. In the most
general formulation, capital allows the aggregate disturbance to be partially
diversified through capital accumulation in favorable aggregate conditions and
through decumulation In unfavorable circumstances (Truman Bewley, 1980; William
Brock, 1982). These intertemporal trading possibilities reduce the income and
wealth effects of aggregate shocks on consumption and employment behavior and
accentuate pure substitution effects.11
This discussion makes clear that intertemporal contract models are
closely related to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis (Lucas and Leonard
Rapping, 1970). A substantial practical difference is the role of measured wage
rates in uncovering the structure of preferences and technology from actual data,
because average wage rates do not index the true marginal product of labor or the
marginal rate of' substitution between C and L in contracts (section IV). This
point is important because almost all empirical studies of intertemporal substi-
tution assumes that measured wage rates fully reflect both margins in the data.
Two notable exceptions are Brown (1983), who attempted to estimate the optimal
program directly on functional form restrictions, and Abowd and David Card
(forthcoming), who attempt to estimate the fraction of workers for whom wage
rates reflect marginal conditions. The methods of Finn Kydland and Edward1414
Prescott(1982) also rest heavily on functional forms and avoid the use of market
price and wage data. But on the conventional assumption, most recent estimates
of iritertemporal substitution on microdata are negligible for prime-age males
(MaCurdy, 1981; Joseph Altonji, 1982); but much larger for those classes of
workers, such as married women, who exhibit regular labor force transitions
(Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980). It is worth pointing out that in light of the
greater labor force and (contractual) job attachments traditionally exhibited by
men the maintained assumption that observed wage rates index marginal conditions
is less likely to apply to them.
Studies by Kydland and Prescott (1982), Robert Barro and Robert King
(1982), Kydland (19814), and Jisoon Lee (19814) conclude that the conventional
intertemporal model cannot explain certain comovements in aggregate time—series
data. The preferred specification is controversial and may require non—separable
preferences and technology. However, contract theory does not depend on these
special assumptions. A contract can be written for any preferences and technol-
ogy, but always divorces measured wage rates from the production efficiency
conditions of the optimum program that it embodies.
VII. CONTRACTS WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION
As noted above, it is difficult to Incorporate transactions costs and
incomplete insurance in contract models. Interest In asymmetric Information
models has been sustained by their potential for doing this in an analytically
tractable manner. The problem Investigated most thoroughly so far is identical
to that of section IV with one bit of information removed: the firm is assumed to
observe the realization of 0 but the worker doesn't observe it (Guillermo Calvo
and Edmond Phelps, 1977; Hall and LIlien, 1979). Recent work by Russell Cooper15
(1981)and John Moore (19811) consider two—sided private information models and
cannot be reviewed here. Readers are forewarned that this section is more tech-
nically demanding than the rest of this survey. However, it may be skipped
without significant loss of continuity.
The contract cannot be conditioned on 0 because the worker cannot
observe it, and since any rational employment decision must depend on the
marginal product of labor, that decision must be delegated to the agent with the
information, namely the firm. The contract takes the following form (Jerry Green
and Charles Kahn, 1983): the worker and firm agree ex ante on a compensation
schedule C(L) (equivalently C(1 —L)).The firm observes B and instructs the
employee to work (1 —L)units of time in exchange for contractual compensation
C(L). Market competition takes the form of offering attractive compensation
schedules C(L), so the competitive contract maximizes expected utility of the
worker subject to expected firm utility (or profit) and information constraints.
The nonlinear contract pricing schedule C(L) is closely related to the multipart—
tariffs of section IV. In fact the solution of the problem Is formally Identical
to the theory of nonlinear pricing (Michael Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Eric Maskin
and Riley, 19814).
Given any schedule C(L), the firm observes 0 and chooses L to maximize
profit. The firm's ex post profit is ir(O, L) =0(1—L)—C(L)so given CCL) and






The firm chooses L in (29) so that the marginal product of labor equals its
marginal cost to the firm. Write the solution to (29) as L(e). Comparative
statics reveals
L'(O)—i/c" < 0
The worker is always instructed to work more in favorable states and less in
unfavorable states. Define C(e) =C(L(e)).Then C'(O) =—OL'(O)> 0, and
compensation unambiguously increases in 0 independently of worker preferences.
The method of solution follows an idea of Mirrlees (1971). Given C(L),
the firm exploits its information through (29), which holds for every possible
realization e. Therefore (29) may be regarded as a differential equation
dC/dL—0, or dC =—OdL.Integrating by parts yields
C(0) —C(0)=—OL+JL(v)dv
(30)
which is a convenient way of representing the information constraint (29)
The competitive equilibrium contract maximizes the worker's expected
utility subject to the firm's expected utility, as before, and to the firm's
exploitation of its information (30). Define the transformation z(0) =JL(v)dv.
Then z'(8) =L(e)and (30) becomes
C(o) =C(0)—ez'(e)+z(8) . (31)117
Furthermore (note: assuming f(1 —L)-1—Lsimplifies the presentation without
affecting essentials)
71(0)max w(8, L) —max0(1 —L(0))—C(0)
L L
0 —8z'—C(0)+Oz'—z e —C(O)—z(0)
Now the contract can be described as a variational problem in z and z'. Recal-
ling that Eu5U(C, L)dG, and substituting for C from (31), we seek a function
z(0) and real numbers A and C(O) that maximize
J U(C(0) —Oz'+z,z')dG +A[V—Jv(e
—z—C(O))dG] (32)
where v(.) is the utility function of the firm. Once z'(O) =L(e)has been
found, (30) is used to calculate C(e). Eliminating 0 from these two expressions
implies C(L).
Two marginal conditions and a boundary condition characterize the
solution. Differentiating (32) wIth respect to C(O) yields:
SoUcdG =Af0vtdG
. (33)
The average marginal utility of consumption for the worker is proportional to
average marginal utility of the firm. Marginal utilities are not necessarily





Denote the upper and lower limits of e in G(e) by e and 0 respectively. Then
multiplying (314) through by d9 integrating and exploiting (33)yields
UL(O) —eU0(e)UL(o) —eUCe)
. (35)
The boundary condition sets (35) to zero, so the contract is production efficient
(e =
UL/UC)
in the best and worst states (Cooper, 1983 gives an intuitive ex-
planation in terms of the revelation principle: the firm cannot overstate the
most extreme realizations to the worker if the distribution G(O) is bounded and
the bounds are common knowledge). Using this fact and integrating (314) yields
the fundamental condition
J•(Uc +Av')g(e)de (UL —eu)g(e)
. (36)
(36) nicely Illustrates the tension between insurance and efficiency
under private information. The contract cannot be production efficient for
8 < 0 < B unless there is efficient sharing of risks in the Borch—Arrow sense for
each state. In addition the solution generally depends on G(0). For example, it
can be shown (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Kahn and Jose Scheinkman, forthcoming) that
the firm may choose the same work hours 1 —Lfor a closed interval of states.
The contract certainly doesn't achieve first—best efficiency in these regions.
Much effort has gone into analyzing the sign of the inefficiency
implied by (36). The interpretation plays heavily on a notion of contractual
commitment and enforcement that doesn't arise in the common information case."9
Forsuppose the contract implies production inefficiency in some state. The
worker and the firm have agreed to contractual terms C(L) ex ante. When this
state materializes, the worker generally can infer the realized value of 0 by his
implicit knowledge of (29) (the production function and utility function are
common knowledge in this formulation; Schwartz, 1983 questions how this knowledge
becomes common). At that point there are unexploited gains from trade and both
parties could benefit by recalibrating L so that 0UL/iJe ex post. However, if
recontractirig is allowed, the contract must unravel, because it is written under
the assumption that both parties bind themselves to its ex ante terms. The
extent to which private information models produce "involuntary" unemployment and
overemployment depends on how these ex ante commitments can be enforced ex post.
While some authors are careful to recognize this important point (especially
Hart, 1983), a convincing description of labor market institutions that embody
this enforcement mechanism in implicit contracts has not been forthcoming.
Three special cases of (36) have been analyzed. The method of proof is
established by Green and Kahn (1983), to which the reader Is referred for de-
tails. Denote the left hand side of (36) as a function of 8, say r(8). The sign
of C(o) is established by calculating its derivatives and ascertaining whether it
achieves a local maximum or minimum for some interior value of 0, using boundary
conditon (35). The results are sensitive to the nature of risk aversion and to
income effects in worker preferences.
Case 1 (Hall and Lilien, 1979). Assume firms are risk neutral, workers
are risk averse and have preferences of the form u =U(C+p(L))-—noincome
effects. Then the left hand side of (36) turns out to be identically zero, and
the contract specifies 0 =UL/UCfor every 8. There is furthermore complete and
optimal risk shifting: u(0) is constant and the firm eats all risks. Here the50
CCL) schedule coincides with an indifference curve, as in fIgure 3 of section IV.
Privateand common knowledge contracts are identical in this case.
Case 2 (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Azariadis, 1983). Maintain the same
assumptions about workers as case 1, but let the firm be risk averse. Here Green
and Kahn's proof may be extended to show that the left hand side of (36) is
negative for almost all 8. Therefore UL/UC < 0 and the marginal social cost of'
labor is less than its ex post marginal product. The worker would like to
recontract for more employment ex post in practically every state, and there is
involuntary underemployment in the sense qualified above. Furthermore, the
worker bears consumption risk and u(0) is increasing in 8.
Case 3 (Green and Kahn, 1983; V.V. Chari, 1983). The firm Is risk
neutral, the worker Is risk averse and has a positive income elasticity of demand
for leisure (as in section IV). Now the integral in (36) is positive for almost
all 0. Therefore UL/UC > 0, and the marginal cost of labor exceeds its marginal
product. The contract leads to "Involuntary overemployment" and the worker would
like to recontract ex post for less work than the firm chooses. Here u(0) Is
decreasing in 0 and the worker is worse off in the more favorable states, as in
section IV.
The nature of these contracts is altered if workers have means to
disassociate current consumption decisions from current earnings. Thus, consider
the third case and assume that the worker can self—insure (Topel and Finis Welch,
1983), for example by borrowing and lending in a perfect capital market in the
Intertemporal context. Then the worker's self—insurance activities imply U
for each 8. Since the firm is risk neutral, the left side of (36) vanishes and
the asymmetric information contract Is perfectly effIcient. Its employment and
consumption properties duplicate that of section IV. Hart (1983) adds the51
assumption that the firm is risk averse and gives an Ingeneous argument for the
relevance of case 2. Risk neutral stockholders would be reluctant to provide
full insurance to the firm's management on moral hazard grounds. However, they
would not be so reluctant to contract for consumption insurance with workers1
because workers' labor supply is delegated through the manager in private infor—
rnation contracts and there are no direct moral hazards. Hence these third
parties could conceivably enforce the U =—Acondition for workers. But then
risk aversion of managers Cv" < 0) implies that the left side of (36) must be
negative for bad realizations, or involuntary underemployment. This argument is
a very delicate one, for it implies that the effect of third party insurance to
workers is partially subverted by workers intermediating it and providing partial
insurance to managers (because workers become effectively risk neutral). Income
risks to managers are reduced by making the contractual C(L) function steeper
than when third party insurance is available. In favorable states the marginal
cost of labor to the firm is increasing too rapidly in (1 —L)and the firm does
not employ as much labor as is socially desirable. In unfavorable states the
marginal cost of labor is falling too fast and too much labor is released.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Not all marriages are made in heaven. Firms go bankrupt, demand shifts
to other locations, supply shifts to other countries, products become obsolete
and relative demands for goods have been known to change over time. Contracts
call for permanent dissolutions when quasi—rents on firm specific human capital
fall to zero. Serious critics of contract theory have built their case on the
observation that quits rise noticably during business cycle expansions (Herschel
Grossman, 1977, 1979). Contracts break down if workers opportunistically accept52
insurance payments in bad times and renege on premium payments by skipping out in
good times. How much of observed voluntary turnover reflects opportunism and how
much is it the rational outcome of moving workers from lower to higher valued
uses?
These Issues occupy much attention in current research, which is pro-
ceeding in a number of different directions too disparate to be usefully reviewed
here. However, these problems are important for delimiting the scope for self—
enforcing contracts that the at—will labor market contracting Institution re-
quires, and for pointing out potential reasons why contracts might be incomplete.
The common knowledge framework illustrates some of these ideas. Under these
circumstances the contract would specify the conditions and terms of its dissolu-
tion up front.
A suitable reinterpretation of the model in section III clarifies the
point. Think of 0 as a permanent disturbance that permanently affects the for-
tunes of the firm, and interpret niL as the value of the worker's time in an
alternative job in another market.12 Then p has the interpretation of the
probability of a permanent separation.The solution is exactly the same as
shown above. The complete contract stipulates a severance payment C2 to those
workers who depart when 0 falls short of 0*. Turnover is efficient if the
severance payment offers complete insurance, but is inefficient if severance
payments are constrained and workers are not fully protected against permanent
separations. For the same reasons as before, there is insufficient turnover In
these latter circumstances (see especially Ito, 1984; also Hercules Polemarchakis
and Weiss, 1978; Arnott, Arthur Hosios and Stiglltz, 1983; John Geanakopolus and
Ito, 1982; Barry Nalebuff and Richard Zeckhauser, 19814).53
The need for interfirrn mobility in a well functioning labor market
suggests important reasons why contracts might be incomplete. A worker's knowl-
edge and perception of outside opportunities do not materialize out of the blue.
Information gathering and job search activities are costly and cannot be a matter
of common knowledge by the idiosyncratic nature of job—worker matches. A worker
must bear some residual job finding risks because of the moral hazard effects of
personal actions on success probabilities (Steven Shavell and Weiss, 1979).
Furthermore, the nature of searchers' interactions gives rise to externalities
that have only recently begun to be understood (Diamond, 1982; Christopher
Pissarides, 19814). A contract must embody a delicate balance of encouraging
mobility in response to permanent changes in demands and discouraging it for
temporary shocks. Full insurance discourages mobility by subsidizing leisure and
reducing job search intensity (Bronars, 1983; Mortensen, 1983b; Ito, 19814). This
is undesirable when severance is economically warranted, but not when demand and
supply disturbances have a more transient character. Since inferences on the
permanent—temporary decomposition of disturbances is itself uncertain, it appears
as If contracts cannot provide complete insurance. We are driven back to conven-
tional models to the extent this is true. The practical importance of contract
thkeory for understanding employment behavior depends on the extent to which
risks are socially diversifiable over space and time.51j
FOOTNOTES
*1 am indebted to Moses Abramovltz, Oliver Hart, Charles Kahn, Robert
Lucas, John Pencavel, Robert Topel and Yoram Weiss for comments and criticism.
They do not necessarily concur with my interpretations. The National Science
Foundation provided financial support.
The common law doctrine of at—will governs employment contracts
(Clive Bull, 1983; Richard Epstein, 19814) and allows termination without fault
at the will of either party at any time. Union contracts and certain Equal
Opportunity legislation are major exceptions to at—will contracts. Both stipu-
late for—cause provisions and extensive adjudication procedures.
2The origins of this problem lie in Wassily Leonteif (19I6). Contract
curve approaches to trade union bargaining recently have been developed by Ian
McDonald and Robert Solow (1981), Thomas MaCurdy and John Pencavel (forthcoming)
and Orley Ashenfelter and James Brown (forthcoming). Implicit contract theory
substantially differs from these in resolving the uncertainty in the distribu-
tion of utility between parties using the theory of optimal risk sharing.
3The method may be unfamiliar. Think of the integrals in (1) and (2)
as the limits of sums across a large number T of discrete possible realizations
of 0 (the relation between a histogram and a continuous density). The discrete
formulation is a gigantic multivariate optimization problem which, by the logic
of the contracts, associates specific values of the C's and p with each possible
realization. These 3T marginal conditions are compactly written as (3) in the
limit. For the third equation in (3), note that a p is associated with each
value of 0 and that is why there are no integrals in these conditions. Some of55
the literature works with the dual problem, but the solution is equivalent by
pareto optimality.
Something equivalent to U—shapedaverage cost curves Is required to
determine n. Contract theory adds no insights to the determination of firm size
and this Issue is Ignored here. Hajime Miyazaki and Hugh Neary (1983) determine
n as in a worker—managed firm. Rosen (1983) does It by a local public goods
argument. These papers and one by Dale Mortensen (1983) further elaborate
models of this type.
5Nor do contracts imply nominalwage rigidity because the price level
would be a conditioning variable. Fixed duration nominal contracts (John
Taylor, 1980; Stanley Fisher, 1977; and Joanna Gray, 1976) must be rationalized
on some other grounds, such as contracting costs and lags and errors in observ-
ing nominal price levels.
6Perceptive readers may have noticed that the complete contract could
have been equivalently implemented by having all employees work p percent of the
time and consume leisure (1 —p)percent of the time rather than having a frac-
tion p fully employed and a fraction (1 —p)completely unemployed. These same
possibilities arise in the incomplete contract, but are definitely not equiva-
lent. The virtue of work sharing does not seem to have been noticed in this
connection. Some factor that gives value to continuity of a worker's employment
time over the period is necessary to avoid pure worksharing solutions. See
below.
7lncreasing the spread of the distribution function G(e) does not
necessarily make the worker worse off, and Smithian risk compensation is more
complex than would appear on the surface. Riskier distributions decrease wel-
fare on risk aversion grounds, but have benefits in allowing workers to choose56
laborsupply most advantageously in more probable high productivity states.
John Hey (1979) summarizes this approach to uncertainty. Nonearned income is
Ignored In what follows because those Issues are better treated in an intertem—
poral context.
8Notlce that consumption Is positively correlated with labor supply
only when UCL < 0 from (114). The sign of UCL is determined by the degree of
risk aversion as well as by the usual curvature restrictions In demand theory.
A richer specification of nonmarket production yields more interesting implica-
tions. For example, those on short work schedules would substitute nonmarket
goods production for market goods (Gilbert Ghez and Becker, 1975). Michael
Grossman (1973) and Daniel Hamermesh (1982) find these types of predictable
differences In consumption (e.g., food prepared away from home) between the
employed and the unemployed.
9This result Is formally identical to a paradox found by James
Mirrlees (1972) in an optimum spatial equilibrium problem. Mirrlees' paradox
arises because of the nonconvexity that a person can occupy only one location
(Richard Arnott and John Riley, 1977). The "nonconvexity" here Is that non—
market production must be self—consumed. If it were possible to trade leisure
on a competitive market then u(O) Is nondecreasing.
°The emerging literature on efficiencywages (see the survey by
Stiglitz, 19814) also rests on the proposition that the wage performs more than
one economic function. Multi—part pricing would allocate resources efficiently
in these models (e.g., a lump—sum bond as well as a marginal wage rate in Carl
Shapiro and Stlglltz's, 19814 shirking problem), but two—part pricing is ruled
out by assumption. Involuntary unemployment results because some margin is not
satisfied when there are not enough prices available to perform all functions.57
Involuntary layoffs in contracts result from imperfections in st.ate-claim5
markets, which is a different way of saying that there are not enough prices.
11This general framework strongly links consumption and labor supply
behavior unless one period preferences are strongly separable. Recent research
has found excess volatility of consumption relative to permanent income and
interest rates, but the extent to which this volatility can be explained by
interactions with labor supply has not been studied.
12Holmstrom (1983) analyzes an offer-matching equilibrium when the
outside opportunity is stochastic. Hall and Edward Lazear (1981$) discuss two—
sided uncertainty in which the bargaining costs preclude ex post renegotiation.
Turnover is socially excessive in this case.58
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